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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

I’M SORRY YOUR HONOR, YOU WILL NOT DECIDE MY FATE
TODAY: THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN THE IMPOSITION OF THE
DEATH PENALTY: A NOTE ON RING v. ARIZONA

I. INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees
every criminal defendant the right to a trial by jury.1 Since this is one of the
most important rights that all American criminal defendants enjoy, the
extension of the Sixth Amendment’s right to a trial by jury beyond core court
proceedings has been an oft-litigated issue. In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court
deemed the Sixth Amendment inapplicable to Arizona’s death penalty
sentencing statute because the aggravating circumstances found by the judge
were not elements of the crime, and therefore these factors did not have to be
decided by a jury.2
Twelve years later, it seemed certain that Timothy Stuart Ring’s petition
for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court would be denied because it was
based on the exact point of law the Court in Walton had refused to recognize.
However, recent decisions of the Supreme Court had begun to call into
question the Walton decision without expressly overruling precedent.3 The
Supreme Court decided to take Case Number 01-488, because of the
unintelligible and convoluted rule it had judicially created with its own
precedent4 Timothy Stuart Ring v. Arizona.5 In taking this case, the Court
seemingly made a commitment to cure this ambiguity and its their rule. After
this case, many issues are seemingly still open. The following questions must
then be asked: Is this rule any better than the previous rule?; What parties may
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating, in relevant part, that: “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed”).
2. Walton v. Ariz., 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990).
3. Id. (holding this same Arizona sentencing statute constitutional under the Sixth
Amendment); Apprendi v. N.J., 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000) (holding unconstitutional New Jersey’s
sentencing guidelines which allowed for a larger sentence to be imposed by the judge than was
imposed by the jury); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 229, 252 (1999) (suggesting that any fact,
other than prior conviction, that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be submitted to
a jury).
4. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 538 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The distinction of Walton offered
by the [Apprendi] Court today is baffling, to say the least.”).
5. Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002).
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partake in what roles in sentencing?; What formula of judge and jury factfinding is constitutional and what sort of system will be unconstitutional after
this decision?
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR TO RING
A.

Walton v. Arizona

In the Supreme Court’s first attempt to decide whether or not the
sentencing scheme of Arizona comported with the Sixth Amendment’s trial by
jury clause, the Court decided Walton v. Arizona. In March 1986, Jeffrey
Walton and two co-defendants went to a bar in Tucson, Arizona, intending to
rob a bar patron, steal his car and leave him tied up while they fled the state in
the victim’s car.6 Walton and his two co-defendants encountered Thomas
Powell in the parking lot of this bar and robbed him as planned. After driving
Powell to the desert and having a conversation with his 2 cohorts, Walton
instructed his co-defendants to wait in the car while he marched Powell off into
the desert. Walton then shot Powell once in the head with a .22 caliber
Derringer. Walton was tried by a jury and sentenced in front of the trial judge
alone. The sentencing was carried out pursuant to Arizona revised statute 13703, the very same way in which the defendant in the later Ring case, Timothy
Ring, was sentenced.7 The trial judge, after finding facts and weighing all of
the aggravating and mitigating factors, sentenced Walton to death.8
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice White and joined by
four other justices,9 found that the aggravating circumstances laid out by the
trial court in this case were not elements of the crime, and thus there was no
need for the jury to find the facts associated with them. The Supreme Court
distinguished between aggravating factors and elements of the crime and
found the factors in this case to be aggravating factors and not elements of the
crime.10 The Supreme Court thus affirmed the judgment of the trial court and

6. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 644-45 (all facts in this paragraph are taken from the Supreme
Court’s recitation of the facts).
7. Id. at 645 (finding the same two aggravating factors found by the trial court in Ring of
pecuniary gain and heinousness).
8. Id. Arizona law required that the sentencing hearing be conducted in front of the judge
alone.
9. Id. at 639 (Justice White’s opinion was signed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O’Connor, Scalia and Kennedy).
10. Id. at 649 (“we cannot conclude that a State is required to denominate aggravating
circumstances ‘elements’ of the offense or permit only a jury to determine the existence of such
circumstances.”).
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the Arizona Supreme Court11 and found the Sixth Amendment inapplicable to
the Arizona death penalty sentencing scheme under section 13-703.
If Walton was the only case in the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the
applicability of the Sixth Amendment to sentencing schemes such as section
13-703, then would have been decided purely on stare decisis grounds. A
petition for a writ of certiorari probably would never have been granted.
However, more recent cases began to question the Court’s jurisprudence on
this issue, while specifically not overruling Walton.12
B.

Jones v. United States

In the Supreme Court’s next attempt to resolve exactly what type of
sentencing scheme would and would not violate the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of a trial by jury, the Court decided Jones v. United States.13
Nathaniel Jones and two others held up two men, resulting in Jones forcing one
of the men back into the car after robbing both men and driving off in the car.14
Jones then let the victim out of the car and was pursued by the police until he
crashed the vehicle into a telephone pole.
Jones was charged with one count of violating the federal carjacking
statute15 and was told by the magistrate judge that he would be sentenced to no
more than fifteen years in jail. The judge submitted instructions to the jury,
which defined the elements solely as in paragraph one of section 2219,16 and
the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The pre-sentence investigation report,
which was submitted to the trial court before the imposition of sentence,
suggested that Jones should be sentenced to twenty-five years because one of
the victims subsequently suffered serious ear damage from the assault

11. State v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017, 1032 (Ariz. 1989) aff’d, Walton, 497 U.S. at 656.
12. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496 (differentiating the Arizona sentencing scheme in Walton
from the New Jersey sentencing scheme in that case); see also Jones, 526 U.S. at 251 (also
differentiating Walton).
13. Jones, 526 U.S. at 227.
14. Id. at 229-30 (all facts in this paragraph are taken from the Supreme Court’s recitation of
the facts).
15. The 1994 version of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 then stated that:
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title takes a motor vehicle
that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the
person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do
so, shall (1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, (2) if
serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title) results, be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both.
16. The elements of the crime submitted to the jury did not include the aggravating factors
later determined at sentencing.
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preceding the carjacking.17 The magistrate judge then sentenced Jones to
twenty-five years for the carjacking count.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether the
Sixth Amendment is violated if a judge sentences a defendant to a term greater
than the jury can sentence the defendant on its factual findings.18 The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter, held that the three paragraphs of section
2119 must be held as separate offenses, with separate elements, that must be
found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt and not by the judge.19
The Court in Jones sidestepped the issue of the applicability of Walton by
simply distinguishing the two statutes and saying that “[w]e are frank to say
that we emphasize this careful reading of Walton’s rationale because the
question implicated by the Government’s position on the meaning of section
2119(2) is too significant to be decided without being squarely faced.”20 In
fact, the dissent believed that there was absolutely no need to address the
Walton case or to cast doubt on it as it believed that the majority had done.21
In looking at the rule that the majority laid down in this case, the dissent
seemed to foreshadow the exact question and result in Ring, saying:
If it is constitutionally impermissible to allow a judge’s finding to increase the
maximum punishment for carjacking by 10 years, it is not clear why a judge’s
finding may increase the maximum punishment for murder from imprisonment
to death. In fact, Walton would appear to have been a better candidate for the
Court’s new approach than is the instant case. In Walton, the question was the
aggravated character of the defendant’s conduct, not, as here, a result that
followed after the criminal conduct had been completed. In distinguishing this
line of precedent, the Court suggests Walton did not “squarely fac[e]” the key
constitutional question “implicated by the Government’s position on the
meaning of § 2119(2).” The implication is clear. Reexamination of this area
of our capital jurisprudence can be expected.22

C. Apprendi v. New Jersey
The final case in this line of jurisprudence prior to Ring was Apprendi v.
New Jersey. In an opinion written by Justice Stevens for five justices, the

17. The injury to the victim which was sustained during the carjacking did not become
serious until after the initial crime, but was a direct result of the assault.
18. Id. at 232.
19. Jones, 526 U.S. at 252 (in effect the aggravating factors should be treated as the
functional equivalent of elements of the crime).
20. Id. at 251.
21. Id. at 271-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) Justice Kennedy was confused as to why
aggravating factors were viewed in one way in Walton and in another way here. If the Court was
correct in Walton, why should the result be different here?
22. Id. at 272 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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Supreme Court held unconstitutional a New Jersey sentencing scheme which
allowed a judge to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a charged
crime was a hate crime.23 This finding then allowed a judge to increase the
maximum sentence imposed for a second degree offense from between five
and ten years to between ten and twenty years.24
The Petitioner, Charles Apprendi, fired several .22 caliber bullets into the
home of an African-American family that had recently moved into a previously
all-white neighborhood in New Jersey.25 After being arrested, Apprendi made
a statement that he did not know the family personally, but that because the
family was black, he did not want them to live in the neighborhood.26
Apprendi was indicted, and later plead guilty to the two counts on the
indictment, for second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose.
The State reserved the right to ask for a sentencing enhancement on the count
related to the facts described above so long as Apprendi could reserve the right
to challenge the constitutionality of the sentencing enhancement scheme. If
the judge was to find that the crime on December 22nd was not a hate crime,
the maximum sentence for this crime would have been between ten and twenty
years total for the two counts. If, however, the judge was to find the hate crime
sentencing enhancement to be present, the maximum sentence for one of the
counts could be twenty years, for a total of thirty years possible incarceration
between the two counts.27
The judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the crime was a
“hate crime” within the meaning of the sentencing enhancement guidelines and
sentenced Apprendi to twelve years for this one count, two years greater than
he could have been sentenced if he was found guilty by a jury without the
sentencing enhancement. This sentence was, however, well within the range
allowed by the sentencing enhancement guidelines of New Jersey’s hate crime
statute.28 This statute allowed for a sentence of between ten and twenty years
on each count.29 In an unsuccessful appeal,30 the New Jersey Supreme Court

23.
24. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69.
25. Id. at 469 (all facts in this paragraph are taken from the Supreme Court’s recitation of the
facts).
26. This statement was later recanted by Apprendi.
27. 5-10 years for each count if this is not a hate crime for 10-20 years total. If count one
was found to be a hate crime, that count would carry a 10-20 year sentence, or a total of 15-30
years for the two counts.
28. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999) provided that: (e) The defendant in
committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals
because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity (repealed 2001).
29. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
30. State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d at 497.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

526

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:521

found the Supreme Court decision in Jones inapplicable and affirmed the
decision.31
After granting a petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether a judge alone, by a preponderance of the evidence, could
impose a sentence longer than could have possibly been imposed if the jury
had found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court
suggested that there is a distinction between an element of a crime and a
sentencing factor because the Constitution requires the former be found
beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury, and allows the judge to find the latter
by the same or a lesser standard.32 The Court further found that “other than the
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”33 In attempting to distinguish the sentencing
scheme in Walton, the Court specifically stated that the sentencing scheme in
this case was different from that in Walton: “[f]inally, this Court has previously
considered and rejected the argument that the principles guiding our decision
today render invalid state capital sentencing schemes requiring judges, after a
jury verdict holding a defendant guilty of a capital crime, to find specific
aggravating factors before imposing a sentence of death.”34
The dissent took issue with the distinction offered by the majority and
suggested that it was “baffling.”35 The dissent further suggested the
jurisprudence of the Court, and the Walton case specifically, dictated that
Apprendi’s sentence should be affirmed.36
III. THE RING CASE IN STATE COURT
A.

Facts leading to the Sentencing of Timothy Stuart Ring

On November 28, 1994, a Wells Fargo armored van arrived at the
Arrowhead Mall in Glendale, Arizona.37 The Wells Fargo courier went into
the Dillard’s department store to pick up a money drop, only to return to the

31. Id. at 493 (“[b]ecause the language in Jones was not essential to its holding, and because
the Court did not expressly overrule the Almendarez-Torres formulation, we believe that case still
states the rationale that we must apply here”).
32. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478.
33. Id. at 490.
34. Id. at 496.
35. Id. at 538 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[t]he distinction of Walton offered by the
[Apprendi] Court today is baffling, to say the least”).
36. Id. at 554 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). It should be noted that Justice O’Connor wrote the
majority opinion in the Walton case and also signed the dissent in Jones.
37. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2432-33. All of the facts in this paragraph are taken from the Supreme
Court’s recitation of the facts.
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parking lot to find the van and driver missing. The truck was located later that
day, with the doors locked and the engine running. The driver was found dead
from a single shot to the head. Over $730,000 in cash and checks were
missing from the van. The police conducted a thorough investigation and
eventually arrested Timothy Ring, after executing a search warrant on his
house and finding in excess of $271,000 in cash.
At the trial of Timothy Ring, the State proffered voluminous evidence of
the crime and conspiracy.38 The judge submitted instructions to the jury on the
alternative charges of premeditated murder and felony murder.39 The jury was
unable to return a verdict on the premeditated murder charge,40 but they were
able to unanimously convict on the lesser instructed charge of felony murder.41
Ring was found guilty of felony murder committed in the commission of an
armed robbery. The verdict of felony murder returned by the jury is what
precipitated the controversy in this case, since only when aggravating factors
are found can the death penalty be imposed upon those guilty of felony
murder.
B.

The Sentencing Phase of Timothy Ring’s Trial

Ring was convicted of first-degree murder pursuant to Arizona rev. stat.
section 13-1105(A)(2), which allows for a first-degree conviction not only in
cases of premeditated murder, but also in cases where the accused:
Acting either alone or with one or more other persons the person commits or
attempts to commit . . . robbery under § 13-1902, 13-1903 or 13-1904 . . . and
in the course of and in furtherance of the offense or immediate flight from the
offense, the person or another person causes the death of any person.42

The pre-Ring version of Arizona’s sentencing statute, 13-703(A), provided in
pertinent part that:
When a defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty to first degree murder as
defined in § 13-1105, the judge who presided at the trial . . . shall conduct a
separate sentencing hearing to determine the existence or nonexistence of the
circumstances included in subsections G and H of this section, for the purpose
of determining the sentence to be imposed. The hearing shall be conducted

38. The State of Arizona offered evidence of the money found at Ring’s house and taped
phone conversations between Ring and his accomplices in which they commented about the
ineptitude of the police investigation.
39. Id. at 2433.
40. Id. Six of the jurors voted to acquit Ring of the charge of premeditated murder.
41. Id.
42. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1105(A)(2) (2001).
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before the court alone. The court alone shall make all factual determinations
required by this section or the Constitution of the United States or this state.43

Under the common law, the judge was required first to find whether Timothy
Ring was the actual killer of the victim44 or at least a “major participant” in the
felony committed.45 The judge must then determine that the defendant
demonstrated “reckless indifference to human life” in order to allow a sentence
of death for felony murder.46 During the sentencing phases a convicted coconspirator implicated Ring as the leader of the group and stated that he
witnessed Ring take the shot at the driver of the armored van.47 This was in
spite of the fact that this same witness, James Greenham,48 testified that he had
previously stated that Ring had nothing to do with the planning and was only
testifying to “pay back” Ring for threats made by Ring to interfere with the
relationship between Greenham and his ex-wife.49 The judge then found that
Ring was eligible for death under Enmund and Tison.
Under subsection G of section 13-703, the judge was next required to find
the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.50 The
trial judge found that two aggravating circumstances under subsection G were
present in this case. Both the fact that “the defendant committed the offense as
consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of
pecuniary value” 51 and “the defendant committed the offense in an especially
heinous, cruel or depraved manner.”52 The judge also found the existence of
one mitigating circumstance, under subsection H of 13-703,53 in that the
43. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(C) (2001) (emphasis added).
44. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (requiring that in order for a charge of
felony murder to carry the death penalty, the accused must be the actual killer).
45.
46. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 n.12 (qualifying Enmund) (stating:
[a]lthough we state these two requirements separately, they often overlap. For example,
we do not doubt that there are some felonies as to which one could properly conclude that
any major participant necessarily exhibits reckless indifference to the value of human life.
Moreover, even in cases where the fact that the defendant was a major participant in a
felony did not suffice to establish reckless indifference, that fact would still often provide
significant support for such a finding.).
47. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2435.
48. State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1144 (Ariz. 2001), rev’d, 122 S.Ct. at 2443 (stating
Greenham’s alleged nickname is “Yoda”).
49. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2435.
50. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(G) (2001).
51. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(G)(5) (2001). The judge concluded that this factor was
present because of the over $700,000 stolen and the $271,000 found at Ring’s house.
52. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(G)(6) (2001). The judge concluded that this factor was
present solely because of the testimony of Ring’s co-conspirator, James Greenham.
53. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(H) (2001) (“The trier of fact shall consider as mitigating
circumstances any factors proffered by the defendant or the state that are relevant in determining
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defendant had a minimal criminal record, which is not specifically enumerated
in subsection G, but allowable under the section.
After making these findings of fact, the trial judge sentenced Timothy
Stuart Ring to death under section 13-703. Timothy Ring was incarcerated
pending the outcome of his appeals.
C. The Arizona Supreme Court
After Timothy Ring was convicted, he appealed directly to the Arizona
Supreme Court, asserting as one ground for reversible error that the trial court
failed to follow the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jones and Apprendi in
considering whether Arizona’s sentencing scheme was indeed constitutional.54
The State, in response, pointed to the fact that the Walton case had specifically
addressed Arizona’s sentencing statute and Jones and Apprendi had
specifically distinguished Walton.55
The Arizona Supreme Court engaged in a full Fifth and Sixth Amendment
analysis regarding Ring’s claims. The court seemed to be confused as how to
reconcile Walton with the Supreme Court’s subsequent jurisprudence in Jones
and Apprendi.56 The Arizona court felt that the instant case was exactly what
Justice O’Connor feared in her dissenting opinion in Apprendi. They stated
that “the present case is precisely as described in Justice O’Connor’s dissent –
Defendant’s death sentence required the judge’s factual findings.”57 Although
the Arizona Supreme Court found the arguments of Timothy Ring persuasive,
they were “bound by the Supremacy Clause in such matters.”58 Therefore the
Arizona Supreme Court found they “must conclude that Walton [wa]s still the
controlling authority and that the Arizona death penalty scheme ha[d] not been
held unconstitutional under either Apprendi or Jones.”59 The Arizona court
thus, albeit reluctantly, accepted the arguments of the State regarding the
applicability of Walton after Apprendi and Jones.

whether to impose a sentence less than death, including any aspect of the defendant’s character,
propensities or record and any of the circumstances of the offense.”).
54. State v. Ring, 25 P.3d at 1150.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1151-52.
57. Id at 1151. Justice O’Connor opined:
a defendant convicted of first-degree murder in Arizona cannot receive a death sentence
unless a judge makes the factual determination that a statutory aggravating factor exists.
Without that critical finding, the maximum sentence to which the defendant is exposed is
life imprisonment, and not the death penalty . . . If the Court does not intend to overrule
Walton, one would be hard pressed to tell from the opinion it issues today.) (citing
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 538 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1152.
59. State v. Ring, 35 P.3d at 1152.
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The Arizona Supreme Court then turned to the other issues allowing for
the death sentence. The court found that if the evidence of Ring’s actual
commission of the homicide or major participation in the crime was limited to
the evidence admitted at trial, then there would not have been sufficient
evidence for the finding of a death sentence under the Enmund-Tison
standard.60 However, because the court found that the judge may take into
account evidence offered at sentencing,61 the trial judge was proper in his
Enmund-Tison determination.
Next, turning to the aggravating factors, the Arizona Supreme Court found
that there was not evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, to support the trial
court’s determination of depravity or heinousness under section 13703(G)(6).62 The court did, however, find that there was evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did have pecuniary gains from this crime
and allowed this aggravating factor under section 13-703(G)(5).63 The court
finally suggested that the one mitigating factor found by the trial court, the lack
of criminal history, was valid, but was entitled to little weight.64
After reviewing all of the evidence, the court found that the lack of the
heinousness itself was not reversible error. The court concluded that it had
previously, and would in this case, support pecuniary gain as the sole
aggravating factor to allow a death penalty conviction for felony murder.65
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death penalty
sentence of Timothy Ring.66
The concurrence argued that the reliance by the majority on mere
Supremacy Clause arguments for its decision, and that its fear that this case
may not be correctly decided, was misplaced.67 The concurrence argued that
this case was clearly correct since the maximum statutory penalty for first
degree murder is death, and without a finding by a jury of first-degree murder,

60. Id.
61. Id. (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(E)). This evidence could include the
testimony of co-conspirator James Greenham.
62. Id. at 1154 (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(G)(6) is now ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(F)(6)
after the 2002 legislative amendments).
63. Id. (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(G)(5) is now ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703(F)(5) after the
2002 legislative amendments).
64. State v. Ring, 35 P.3d at 1155.
65. Id. at 1156 (“After our independent review, we conclude that even crediting Defendant’s
minimal criminal record, the mitigating evidence is not sufficient to call for leniency in light of
the facts of this case. This murder was not the result of sudden impulse or loss of control nor a
robbery gone bad, but a planned, ruthless robbery and killing.”).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1157 (Martone, J., concurring). Since the Apprendi case specifically distinguished
Walton, the issue of Apprendi calling Walton into doubt is moot.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

I’M SORRY YOUR HONOR, YOU WILL NOT DECIDE MY FATE TODAY

531

the death penalty could not be imposed. Finally, the concurrence suggested
that it should matter not who sentences the convicted defendant.68
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN RING V. ARIZONA
A.

Making it to the Supreme Court

After losing his appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court, Timothy Ring then
petitioned for a writ of certiorari, to the U.S. Supreme Court which was
granted.69 The Court accepted the Petitioner’s Brief,70 the Respondent’s
brief,71 a Reply Brief from the Petitioner,72 as well as Amicus Curiae Briefs
from the Attorneys General of multiple states,73 the Criminal Justice Law
Center74 and the National Crime Victims Law Institute.75 The case was argued
on April 22, 2002.
The Court decided the matter, with six members76 voting to reverse the
Arizona Supreme Court decision and invalidate Walton in favor of Apprendi
and Jones. Justice Scalia delivered a concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Thomas. Justice Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer filed
an opinion concurring only in the judgment. Justice O’Connor filed a
dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Each of these opinions
will be handled separately below.
B.

The Majority Opinion

After a recitation of the facts and procedural history which brought this
case to the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority,

68. Id. at 1158 (Martone, J., concurring).
69. State v. Ring, 35 P.3d 1139, cert. granted, 122 S.Ct. 865 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2002) (No. 01488).
70. Brief for Petitioner, Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002) (No. 01-488) (2002 WL
432399).
71. Brief for Respondent, Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002) (No. 01-488) (2002 WL
481144).
72. Reply Brief for Petitioner, Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002) (No. 01-488) (2002
WL 649366).
73. Amicus Curiae Brief for Respondent, Filed by Attorneys General of Ala., Colo., Del.,
Fla., Idaho, Ind., Miss., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.Y., Pa., S.C., Utah, Va., Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct.
2428 (2002) (No. 01-488) (2002 WL 481140).
74. Amicus Curiae Brief for Respondent, Filed by Ariz. Voice for Crime Victims and Nat’l
Crime Victim Law Inst., Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002) (No. 01-488) (2002 WL
730737).
75. Amicus Curiae Brief for Respondent, Filed by Criminal Justice Legal Found., Ring v.
Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002) (No. 01-488) (2002 WL 730734).
76. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2432 (Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the court in which
Justices Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas joined).
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immediately recognized that the statute called into question by Petitioner
Timothy Ring had been squarely addressed before.77 The previous case78 had
directly addressed the issue of the constitutionality of the Arizona death
penalty sentencing scheme and found that scheme constitutional under the
Sixth Amendment.79 The Court granted certiorari to decide the impact of its
more recent cases which seemed to cast doubt on the Walton decision without
explicitly overturning it. For this reason, the Court was prompted into its most
recent venture into this area of constitutional law.
The Court recognized that based solely on the findings of the jury, the
maximum sentence that Timothy Ring could have been given was life in
prison, and only after the intervention of the judge alone could Ring be
sentenced to death.80 The Court wanted to answer the question of whether this
aggravating factor could be found by a judge or was required by the Sixth
Amendment of the Constitution81 to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.82 One of the main questions raised by the Court in this case was the
differentiation between elements of a crime and aggravating circumstances of
a crime, and what procedural differences should exist between the two at the
trial level. The Court concluded that the differences should not be one of form,
but rather of effect.83 In foreshadowing to Justice Scalia’s concurrence, the
Court did not believe that the mere naming of a factual finding as one or the
other should allow it to be found constitutionally by the judge and not the
jury.84 The answer, the Court concluded, was that if a factual finding has the
ability to increase the sentence to a level greater than it can be found without
this finding, then that fact must be considered the functional equivalent of an
element of the crime, and thus cannot be found solely by the judge, no matter
what it may be called.85
The Court rejected Arizona’s argument that since the Arizona statute86
specifically allowed for the sentence of life or a sentence imposing the death
penalty; that these are mere sentencing options to which the judge has

77. Id. at 2437.
78. Walton, 497 U.S. at 649.
79. Id.
80. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2437. In Arizona, a defendant cannot be sentenced to death without
the finding of an aggravating factor, which can only be found by a judge.
81. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273-74 (1948) (making the Sixth Amendment applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
82. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2437.
83. Id. at 2439-40.
84. Id. at 2439.
85. Id. at 2443.
86. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1105(C) (2001).
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discretion to sentence within the range authorized by the jury verdict.87 The
Court noted again, that in effect, the verdict of the jury cannot impose a
sentence of death, but only a sentence of life imprisonment, unless a further
factual finding is made by the judge. Because this further finding by the judge
increases the sentence above the maximum penalty that could be imposed by
the jury, this scheme is unconstitutional.88 The Court also found unpersuasive
the distinction between sentencing factors and elements proffered by
Arizona.89 Finally, the Court rejected Arizona’s argument that decision on the
death penalty are unique from the Court’s other jurisprudence on the Sixth
Amendment and therefore the Court should allow the aggravating factors for
the death penalty to be found by the judge alone.90 The Court found no reason
to except capital defendants from the Sixth Amendment guarantees laid out in
Jones and Apprendi91 and rejected this argument as well.
The Court concluded by stating the importance of stare decisis,92 and
suggested that a decision of the Supreme Court should never be overruled
lightly, but can be overruled in cases where the “necessity and propriety of
doing so has been established[;] . . . this is such a case.”93 The Court found
that “Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable; our Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence cannot be home to both.”94 The Court then overruled Walton95
“to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury to find an
aggravating circumstance necessary for the imposition of the death penalty.”96
The Court finally held that the “aggravating factors” in the Arizona scheme
were nothing more than “the functional equivalent of an element of a greater
offense”97 and “the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.”98
In conclusion, Justice Ginsburg stated that it would make no sense to leave the
87. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2440. Our country has a significant history of discretionary
sentencing by judges, a fact not lost on the dissenting Justices.
88. Id. at 2440-41.
89. Id. at 2441 (in large part reciting the differentiation found by the majority in Walton
based on the fact that the aggravating factors were called aggravating factors and not elements of
the crime).
90. Id. (stating “[d]eath is different”).
91. Id. at 2442 (“Arizona presents ‘no specific reason for excepting capital defendants from
the constitutional protections . . . extend[ed] to defendants generally, and none is readily
apparent.’” (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 539 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
92. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2442-43 (although “the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental
importance to the rule of law[,] . . . [o]ur precedents are not sacrosanct” (quoting Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989)).
93. Id. at 2443.
94. Id.
95. Id. (“accordingly, we overrule Walton”).
96. Id.
97. Ring, 122 S.Ct at 2443 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, n. 19).
98. Id. at 2443.
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Court’s jurisprudence the way it was before this decision; to say that an
increase in sentence by two years must be found by a jury, but that the finding
of death over life could be found by a judge. The Supreme Court thus reversed
the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court and remanded the case for further
proceedings.99
C. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, was torn by two conflicting
interests in attempting to resolve this case. On the one hand, Justice Scalia did
not agree with fact the Constitution necessarily places procedural sentencing
requirements on the states, and therefore did not understand how any
sentencing, whether conducted by the judge or the jury, can rise to the level of
a constitutional issue.100 On the other hand, Justice Scalia recognized that his
decisions in previous cases, such as Apprendi, required him to find that “all
facts essential to the imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant
receives – whether the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing
factors, or Mary Jane – must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.”101
Justice Scalia further recognized a possible manipulation of the
Constitution after Walton in that states could call certain factors relevant to
sentencing an aggravating factor for the judge to decide, and make an end-run
around the constitutional guarantee of a trial by jury.102 For these reasons,
Justice Scalia decided to join the opinion of the Court.103
D. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence
While Justice Kennedy still believed that Apprendi was incorrectly
decided, he stated that Apprendi is now the law and must be followed. In
applying the law of Apprendi to the facts of this case, Justice Kennedy
concluded that “[i]t is beyond question that during the penalty phase of a firstdegree murder prosecution in Arizona, the finding of an aggravating
circumstance exposes ‘the defendant to a greater punishment than that
authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict.’”104 Based on this application of the
facts of this case to the law of Apprendi, Justice Kennedy stated that he

99. Id.
100. Id. at 2444 (Scalia, J., concurring).
101. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
102. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2445. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia is not making any
particular accusations, but rather stating the possibility of abuse.
103. Id. at 2445. (Scalia, J., concurring).
104. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494).
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“agree[d] with the Court . . . that Apprendi and Walton cannot stand together as
the law.”105
E.

Justice Breyer’s Concurrence in the Judgment

Justice Breyer did not sign on to the majority opinion of the Court in this
case, but nonetheless concurred in the judgment because he believed that death
penalty sentencing by the jury is mandated by the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.106 Justice Breyer reached this conclusion because,
in his opinion, without special procedural safeguards when the death penalty is
involved, the punishment will be considered cruel and unusual.107 Because the
focus of this case note is not the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the
Eighth Amendment, this opinion will not be addressed further.108
F.

The Dissent

Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the
majority opinion. The dissenters agreed with the majority that there is no room
for both Walton and Apprendi to stand in concert.109 The main difference
between the dissent and the majority, however, is that the dissent would have
overruled Apprendi, not Walton.110 Justice O’Connor believed that Apprendi
was wrongly decided because the rule in Apprendi was “not required by the
Constitution, by history, or by our prior cases . . . [a]nd it ignores the
significant history in this country of . . . discretionary sentencing by judges.”111
Justice O’Connor then discussed the effects of Apprendi on the U.S. legal
system and her belief that the number of habeas corpus petitions has risen
sharply, a phenomenon she attributed to the Apprendi decision.112 Since
Justice O’Connor simply saw Ring as an extension of Apprendi, she believed
that this phenomenon would just increase the number of claims of

105. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 2446 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
107. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2446 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
108. Id. at 2445 (Scalia, J., concurring). It is worth noting that Justice Scalia scalds Justice
Breyer for this approach, saying, “today’s judgment has nothing to do with jury sentencing” and
“there is really no way in which Justice Breyer can travel with the happy band that reaches
today’s result unless he says yes to Apprendi. Concisely put, Justice Breyer is on the wrong
flight; he should either get off before the doors close, or buy a ticket to Apprendi-land.
109. Id. at 2448 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting. It is of note that Justice O’Connor authored the majority
opinion in Walton and authored the dissent in Apprendi.
111. Id. at 2449 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 544 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
112. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2449 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the belief of the Office of
the United States Courts for the increase in habeas corpus petitions).
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unconstitutionality of sentences based on Apprendi and Ring.113 Because the
dissenters believed that the sentencing in this case was in accordance with the
Sixth Amendment, they would have affirmed the conviction of Timothy
Ring.114
V. RING AND BEYOND, THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RING HOLDING
This section will deal with the implications of the Ring decision. The
focus will be not only on the applicability of this decision on statutes that are
very similar to it, but also its more general applicability to other state death
penalty statutes, which may now be called into doubt. This section will also
address sentencing schemes which seem to move elements of the crime, to be
decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, to sentencing considerations
which can be found by the judge by the same or a lesser standard. These
schemes may also face constitutional scrutiny in the near future.
This section will accomplish this by first looking at the holding in Ring, as
well as Apprendi and Jones, and determining exactly what these cases hold and
what they require of lawmakers in order to guarantee compliance with the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the implications of the Ring decision will be
discussed, both constitutionally and practically, how these cases will affect the
cases already on the books, and how they will affect cases in the future. Third,
other state statutes which may be implicated by this decision will be addressed.
Finally, the subsequent case law will be examined, to determine how the lower
courts are indeed distinguishing or following Ring in evaluating their own state
statutes.
A.

What are the Requirements Now?

One of the principal issues raised is what exactly the Ring case requires
after its adjudication. Does this case say that juries alone must find facts
which could lead to a greater period of sentencing, or does the decision say that
judges alone must not find these facts? The facts of the Ring case were of a
sentencing scheme which allowed a judge, sitting without a jury, to find the
facts relevant to the aggravating factors listed in the Arizona first-degree
murder statute.115 So, the obvious holding is that judges alone must not find
the relevant factors that may lead to a death-penalty sentence; but is the
obvious extension of this that these facts must be found by juries alone? The

113. Id. at 2449-50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The number of second or successive habeas
corpus petitions filed in the federal courts also increased by 77% in 2001.”).
114. Id. at 2450 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
115. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (2001).
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question is important because of the volume of statutes which employ some
sort of hybrid system for determining these factors.116
The exact holding of the case is this:
We hold that Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable; our Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence cannot be home to both. Accordingly, we overrule Walton to the
extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an
aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty.
Because Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional
equivalent of an element of a greater offense,’ the Sixth Amendment requires
that they be found by a jury.117

It seems plain that a scheme by which the judge may increase the
maximum sentence of a convicted defendant outside of the presence of the jury
is unconstitutional both in death-penalty cases,118 as well as any non-capital
case.119 As stated above, one question that remains open is whether or not a
system can survive Sixth Amendment scrutiny if it uses some combination of
the judge and the jury to make the decision relevant to aggravating factors, or
if a jury alone must decide those issues beyond a reasonable doubt. The crux
of the issue will most likely lie in the nature of the involvement of the two
parties, the judge and the jury. If the fact-finding is truly left to the jury, and
the judge has little or no discretion once the jury renders its opinion, then this
system should be acceptable. These different variations will be addressed
specifically below.
B.

Author’s Comments on the Ring decision

In looking at the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence leading up to the Ring
case, it seemed plain that the Court needed to directly answer the question of
the applicability of Walton after Jones and Apprendi. After the Court’s
decisions in Jones and Apprendi, it was painfully obvious that the Court was
simply attempting to distinguish its cases in an effort to preserve stare decisis.
These distinctions became rather arbitrary; a point even noticed by some
members of the Court themselves.120 Stare decisis is very important, but what
became much more important and obvious to the Court was that its decisions,
read in concert with each other, made absolutely no sense.

116. Hybrid and other varied sentencing schemes which may be implicated by the Ring
decision will be more fully discussed herein.
117. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470; see also Jones, 526 U.S. at 252.
120. Id. at 538 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[t]he distinction of Walton offered by the
[Apprendi] Court today is baffling, to say the least”).
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The Court needed to take this case; not only if it wanted to reverse Walton,
but also if it wanted to re-affirm Walton. The Court needed to provide a better
answer than was given after Jones and Apprendi. In doing what the Court did,
it did make its jurisprudence much more consistent, but was it the right choice?
In deciding, through this line of cases, that any factor which may lead to
the increase in sentence must not be found by a judge, sitting without a jury,
the Court relied on the Sixth Amendment.121 Does the right to a trial by jury
equate to a right to sentencing by a jury and factual determinations that a crime
was committed heinously,122 or that a crime was a hate crime,123 or that a crime
caused serious bodily injury?124 Some of the members of the Court did not
believe that these proceedings are equivalent; they believed that a trial by jury
and sentencing are two different things.125 But besides the view of these
dissenting Justices, did the other Justices get it right?
As a practical matter, Justice Scalia suggests in his concurring opinion in
Ring that this rule must be promulgated, because if it does not, the danger for
abuse is very high.126 Justice Scalia artfully points out that if we are to focus
on form, rather than effect, then state legislatures could simply make an endrun around the trial by jury requirement of the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution.127 By simply characterizing an enhancing guideline as a
sentencing guideline, rather than as an element, the trial by jury would be
usurped by allowing this fact to be found by the judge alone.128 Justice Scalia
is not accusing the state legislatures of such an unconstitutional practice, but
correctly recognizes the danger which is inherent in any finding of fact by the
judge solely which could increase a defendant’s sentence.129
As an initial matter, it seems much safer to have a jury decide these facts,
simply to avoid any appearance of impropriety and to guarantee compliance
with the Sixth Amendment. Whereas it is true that practical considerations are
important, the chief concern is whether the practice of the states, Arizona
specifically, was in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.
Therefore, is Justice O’Connor correct in suggesting that this line of cases is
121. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating, in relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed”).
122. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443.
123. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470.
124. Jones, 526 U.S. at 252.
125. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2449 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the rule derived in
Apprendi and extended in Ring is not required by the Constitution, or history, or by our prior
cases and in fact may cut against some of out prior case).
126. Id. at 2445 (Scalia, J., concurring).
127. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
128. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
129. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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not required by the Sixth Amendment? To decide this, the exact requirements
of the Sixth Amendment must be determined.
The requirement of a trial by jury is one of the oldest and most respected
legal concepts. The history of the right to a trial by jury dates back to the
Magna Carta.130 Jury trials then transpired through English legal history. Jury
trials came to America and flourished because of the deep resentment of royal
interference. The right to a trial by jury was added as the Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution, guaranteeing the right to trial by jury in criminal cases to all
accused in Federal court. All of the original states of the union included a right
to trial by jury in their respective state constitutions and every state entering
the Union has included the same protection.
The right to a trial by jury could be something completely different than
the right to sentencing by jury (as dealt with by the Ring case as the Ring case
dealt with) and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudential history has been less than
clear on this issue. Initially, the Court had found that there was no Sixth
Amendment right to be sentenced by a jury, even in a capital case.131 This
holding was elaborated in McMillan, where the judge increased the sentence of
a convicted defendant.132 The Supreme Court then limited the holding of
McMillan in Apprendi. The Court held in Apprendi that a judge may not
increase the sentence of a convicted defendant to a term greater than what the
jury could have sentenced the defendant.133 This limitation of McMillan
allowed the Court to say that the fact-finding jury of the Sixth Amendment
should do the fact-finding.134 There was an exception carved out of Apprendi
for prior convictions as a sentencing factor, since this requires no factfinding.135 Because the sentencing factors in Ring would allow for a sentence
of death, when the jury would only sentence life imprisonment, this statute
seems squarely unconstitutional under Apprendi.
After Apprendi, it seems only logical that the Arizona statute allows
judicial fact-finding and must not be allowed. The Ring decision itself is not
that surprising as applied to the Arizona statute. The reasoning offered in
Apprendi to distinguish Walton was indeed “baffling”136 and it was only a

130. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-54 (1968) (providing a history of the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of a trial by jury).
131. Spaziono v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984) (“The fact that a capital sentencing is like
a trial in some respects . . . does not mean that it is like a trial in respects significant to the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial.”).
132. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (there is no Sixth Amendment right to
jury sentencing).
133. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487, n. 13.
134. Id. at 497.
135. Id. at 488.
136. Id. at 538 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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matter of time before the Court considered the issue and ultimately found that
Walton could not stand with Apprendi. The logical extension of Apprendi to
capital defendants makes perfect sense, since capital defendants should have
more, not less, protection than non-capital defendants. The truly interesting
portion of this opinion is not what it does to the Arizona statute, but rather
what happens to other statutes that may still involve some judicial fact-finding.
Those statutes are more fully discussed below.
C. Statutes Affected by the Ring Decision
Thirty-eight states and the federal government allow for the death penal by
as the ultimate form of punishment for the most heinous crimes.137 The form
of sentencing procedures which allow for the imposition of the death penalty
vary greatly from state to state. With something this important, it is essential
to ensure that the convicted defendant’s constitutional rights are absolutely
protected.
It has been shown that the Arizona statute is unconstitutional. What about
statutes that have the exact same scheme for sentencing as Ring? What about
states that have a system where the jury makes recommendations to the judge,
but he is not bound by those recommendations? What about states which
allow a judge to sentence if the jury is unable to reach a decision? What is the
best sentencing system to ensure constitutional compliance?
1. The Arizona Statute
One thing is sure after the Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona; Arizona’s
death penalty sentencing scheme, section 13-703, is now unconstitutional.138
The Arizona legislature wasted no time in amending 13-703 to comport with
Ring v. Arizona and the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. Even before the
Ring decision was handed down by the Supreme Court, on February 11th,
2002, the Forty-Fifth Legislature was hard at work in their second regular
session of 2002. The House of Representatives proposed legislation139 to
completely strike section C and amend sections G and H to change all
references from “the court” to “trier of fact.” These subtle changes seem to
make section 13-703 constitutional. The passage of this bill was conditioned

137. See Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2447 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (saying that
currently there are states that have moratoriums on the death penalty).
138. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (2001).
139. H.B. 2671, 45th Leg., 2d. Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2002).
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by the House of Representatives in section 6 of the bill on the exact holding of
Ring.140
After the Ring v. Arizona decision was handed down by the Supreme Court
on June 24, 2002, the Arizona Legislature amended its statute in order to meet
the requirements of the Supreme Court. The house bill, formerly introduced
conditionally as H.B. 2671, was formally introduced to the House of
Representatives141 and to the Senate142 simultaneously on July 30th, 2002. No
debate was had, and the bill was engrossed by both houses of the Legislature
on August 1st of 2002 and passed by both houses of the Legislature on the
same day.143
The Arizona statute did exactly what the Supreme Court asked the
Legislature to do, remove the judge from the fact-finding role after the
conviction has been handed down. The old scheme, discussed at length
previously, required the judge to engage in fact-finding in order to determine
the presence or absence of aggravating factors.144 This was done by the judge
alone outside of the presence of the jury. The revised statute removes this role
from the province of the judge and places it squarely in the hands of the trier of
fact.145 This is seemingly what the Ring decision requires146 and what now
seems to make this statute constitutional. This statute now comports with the
Ring decision, but what about states that have the same or similar statutes?
Those statutes will be discussed in the next section.
2. States with Similar Statutes
Four states other than Arizona had a very similar system by which the
judge conducted the sentencing hearing by herself, outside of the presence of
the jury. The judge then makes factual findings regarding the aggravating
and/or mitigating factors. If the judge is able to outweigh the mitigating
factors with aggravating factors, he alone then, may sentence the convicted
defendant to death.

140. Id. at § 6 (“This act does not become effective unless the United States Supreme Court
holds in Ring v. Arizona, United States Supreme Court case #01-488, that, in death penalty cases
it is unconstitutional for a judge and not a jury to impose a sentence of death.”).
141. H.B. 2001, 45th Leg., 5th. Special Sess. (Ariz. 2002).
142. S.B. 1001, 45th Leg., 5th. Special Sess. (Ariz. 2002).
143. Id. (enacted version).
144. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (2001) (the judge is to conduct a second phase of the trial
after the guilt phase to determine sentencing).
145. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (Supp. 2002) (now the judge may only find the facts of
sentencing if the defendant agrees to waive her right to a trial by jury).
146. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443 (holding that the judge alone may not make the finding of
aggravating factors).
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One such state, Colorado, has already amended its statute147 in accordance
with the Ring decision. Colorado’s previous statute148 allowed the sentencing
procedures, including the fact-finding, to be conducted in front of a panel of
three judges. This was changed by Colorado’s Sixty-Third General Assembly
on July 12th, 2002.149 The Colorado Legislature removed all references to the
three-judge panel and replaced it with a trial judge sitting in front of the trial
jury. The procedure now mandates the trial judge to allow factual arguments
to be made by the parties and then instruct the jury that they must find
unanimously at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.150 The
judge will be bound by this decision of the jury and if the jury is unable to
reach a decision to all of the above specifications, the sentence automatically
reverts to life imprisonment.151 In addition to the amendments by the
legislature, the Colorado Supreme Court has also opined as to the
constitutionality of their death penalty sentencing scheme152 and concluded
that its system of capital sentencing is unconstitutional under Ring.153 Because
of these recent developments, Colorado’s amended statutory scheme should
now be constitutional.
Montana also had a very similar statute154 which required that “the hearing
must be conducted before the court alone.”155 However, even before the Ring
decision was handed down, the Montana Legislature introduced and passed
House Bill 521,156 which made subtle yet drastic changes to the Montana code.
This bill codified section 46-1-401 of the Montana Code, which now requires
that the jury find the enhancement actions in a separate proceeding
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.157 This seems to make the
Montana statute comport with Ring and remove Montana from the
unconstitutional realm of death penalty sentencing by a judge alone.

147. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (Supp. 2002).
148. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (2001) (formerly COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103
(2001)).
149. H.B. 1005, 63rd Gen. Assem., 3d Extraord. Sess., (Colo. 2002).
150. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (Supp. 2002) (the three judge panel will only engage in
fact-finding during sentencing if the defendant knowingly waives his or her right to a trial by
jury).
151. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(c) (Supp. 2002).
152. Woldt v. State, Nos. 97SA193, 97SA392, 2003 WL 459419, at *2 (Colo. 2003).
153. Press Release, Office of the Colorado State Attorney General, Attorney General Salazar
to Seek U.S. Supreme Court Review of Colorado Court Rulings Striking Death Penalty Sentences
(March 12, 2003) (stating that in the view of the Colorado Attorney General, the Ring decision
needs to be clarified because of conflicting applications) (on file with author).
154. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001).
155. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301(1) (2001).
156. H.B. 521, 57th Leg., Reg.. Sess., (Mont. 2001).
157. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-1-401 (Supp. 2002).
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Nebraska was another state which allowed sentencing to be done by
judges, including the factual finding of aggravating factors. Nebraska’s
statute158 required that a panel of three judges find the facts necessary for
aggravation or mitigation and accordingly sentence the accused to life or death.
This statute was amended following the Ring decision to remove the factfinding associated with aggravating and mitigating factors from the hands of
the three judge panel and require that this be done by the jury alone.159 The
only way that the panel of three judges may now hear the facts relating to the
aggravating factors is if the defendant knowingly waives his right to have these
facts heard by a jury. The Governor of Nebraska called the State’s Legislature
into a special session to decide on the constitutionality of the state statute in
November. The statute was amended by the Legislature and signed by the
Governor on November 22nd, 2002.160 In addition to these amendments, the
Nebraska Supreme Court recently decided that its statute was also
unconstitutional under Ring.161 With these timely changes, Nebraska also
seems to have a system that comports with the Ring decision.162
Idaho is the final state which requires the trial judge make these factual
findings and sentence a defendant without the benefit of a jury. The Idaho
statute163 is very similar to Colorado and Arizona’s statutes before they were
amended. This statute was not directly ruled unconstitutional by the Ring
decision, since the only issue before the Court was the Arizona statute, but this
statute seems to be squarely unconstitutional and will need to be amended.
The Idaho Legislature has taken no action as of yet, but the Idaho Supreme
Court has remanded death-row inmates who were sentenced under this scheme
for re-sentencing in light of the Ring decision.164 The Idaho legislature is now
in the process of amending its statute to comport with the Supreme Court’s

158. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (2001).
159. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (Supp. 2003).
160. NEB. LEGIS. 3SS 1 (2002).
161.
162. State v. Gales, No. S-01-1231, 2003 WL 1571588, at *18 (Neb. 2003) (stating that in
light of the Ring decision, the Nebraska statute, before amended, was unconstitutional).
163. IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 2000).
164. State v. Fetterly, 52 P.2d 874, 875 (Idaho 2002) (stating:
[s]ubsequent to the decision in the district court and the appeal to this Court the United
States Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona which appears to invalidate the death
penalty scheme in Idaho which to this time has allowed the sentencing judge to make
factual findings of the aggravating factors necessary to the imposition of a death sentence.
Ring requires those factual findings to be made by a jury. In light of that decision it is
necessary to remand this case for further consideration by the district court.).
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ruling in Ring, but the Idaho code has yet to be revised to reflect those
changes.165
3. Hybrid Statutes
The first of the statutes which were not directly addressed by the Court’s
opinion in Ring, but are definitely indirectly implicated are the so-called
“hybrid” statutes.166 Whereas these statutes differ slightly from state-to-state,
they share the common thread that both the judge and the jury are involved in
fact-finding to determine whether or not to sentence a convicted defendant to
death.
The first of these statutes is found in the Alabama code.167 This code
provision mandates that the judge initially is to instruct the trial jury as to
aggravating and mitigating factors.168 The jury then deliberates and attempts
to determine if one of the statutory aggravating factors exists in the minds of at
least ten of the twelve jurors and that it outweighs any mitigating factors.169
The jury then issues a sentence recommendation to the judge presiding over
sentencing.170 The trial judge then enters another phase of sentencing in which
he may hear further arguments from the parties and then makes written
findings of fact about aggravating and mitigating circumstances.171 The judge
then sentences the convicted defendant by himself. The judge may take the
jury’s findings into account, but he is in no way bound by that
recommendation.172 The Alabama system has been tested by court cases, but
at this point, the courts have been able to distinguish Ring because of the facts
of those particular cases.173
Three other states had similar statutes at the time of the Ring opinion:
Delaware,174 Florida,175 and Indiana.176 These statutes are all very similar in

165. See Gregory Hahn, Death Penalty Bill Clears House, Kempthorne has Already Promised
to Sign the Measure, THE IDAHO STATESMAN, Feb. 5, 2003, at 04, available at 2003 WL
4775490.
166. Hybrid statutes were employed by Alabama, Delaware, Florida and Indiana.
167. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-45 – 13A-5-47 (1999).
168. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(a) (1999).
169. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e) (1999).
170. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(a) (1999).
171. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-47(b) – 13A-5-47(e) (1999).
172. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47(e) (1999).
173. See e.g., Ex Parte Waldrop, No. 1001194, 2002 WL 31630710 (Ala. Nov. 22, 2002) at
*5 (Ring not implicated where the aggravating factor of “committed during the commission of a
robbery” is part of the offense which was proven beyond a reasonable doubt through the jury’s
verdict of guilt).
174. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209 (2001).
175. FLA. STAT. ch. § 921.141 (2001).
176. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (1998).
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the crucial fact that all of these statutes involve a jury making an advisory
verdict to a judge who is not bound by that determination, who then solely
issues a verdict.
In anticipation of possible constitutional challenge to their state statutes,
some of the states which used this sentencing system have already taken steps
after Ring to ensure that their sentencing schemes comport with the Supreme
Court’s decision.177 Delaware has already amended its death penalty
sentencing statute178 in order to make the jury’s recommendation a report and
require that the jury alone make the factual findings.179 Indiana has amended
its statute180 to say that if the jury has made a determination, then the judge
must sentence the convicted defendant accordingly, leaving no room for
judicial interpretation of the jury’s recommendation.181 Alabama182 and
Florida183 also use a system of advisory verdicts which have yet to be revised
after Ring. These states have had a few challenges to their statutes that have
distinguished Ring on the grounds that the jury is still doing the actual factfinding.184 This of course does not mean that a court of these states could not
preempt the legislature and rule the statute unconstitutional based on Ring, if
the facts of a particular case are identical to Ring.185
The reason that these statutes are under constitutional scrutiny after the
Ring decision is not based on the direct holding of Ring,186 but rather the
proposition that Ring suggests any judicial fact-finding in relation to an
increase in sentencing is unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment. These
statutes do require fact-finding by the jury, but the possible constitutional
defect is that judges are not required to follow these recommendations and may
engage in their own fact-finding resulting in a sentence of death despite the
jury’s inability to sentence the defendant to death. The main issue is whether a
non-binding recommendation of the jury is enough to remove these statutes

177. Press Release, Office of the Del. Atty. Gen’l, New Death Penalty Bills Signed Into Law
(July 23, 2002) (on file with author).
178. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4209 (Supp. 2002).
179. 2002 DEL. LAWS 423 (2002) (mandating that the judge adopt the jury’s
recommendation).
180. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 2002).
181. 2002 IND. LEGIS. SERV. 117 (Supp. 2002).
182. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-45 – 13A-5-47 (1999).
183. FLA. STAT. ch. § 921.141 (2001).
184. These cases will be discussed at length herein.
185. Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla. 2002), cert. denied 123 S.Ct. 662 (U.S.
Dec. 6, 2002) (the Florida Supreme Court has already addressed this issue, holding for now that
their statute is constitutional, but three members of the court are not convinced).
186. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443 (the direct holding is that the judge alone may not make the
factual determinations which can increase a convicted defendant’s sentence to a level greater than
the sentence that a jury could give to the defendant).
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from constitutional scrutiny. This recommendation is the only thing that
separates these hybrid statutes from the statute held unconstitutional in Ring.
This non-binding nuance will likely be insufficient to save these statutes from
the constitutional scrutiny. It was a wise choice for the legislatures of
Delaware, Florida, Indiana and Alabama to revise their statutes with an eye not
towards the letter of Ring, but rather the spirit of Ring.
4. States Which Still Allow Some Judicial Fact-Finding
There is yet another category of state statutes which have sentencing
schemes implicated by the Ring decision. These statutes advise that the jury
should make the factual determinations, but have a provision which may still
allow for some judicial fact-finding of the type prohibited by Ring. These
statutes do not seem facially unconstitutional after the Ring decision, but may
still have fatal errors.
Missouri187 and Nevada188 each employ a system by which the jury hears
testimony from both of the parties as to statutory aggravating and mitigating
factors.189 The jury is then instructed as to the requisite burden of proof and
procedures and they then retire for deliberation. The jury reports its verdict to
the judge who is to sentence the defendant accordingly.190 Up to this point,
these statutes seem squarely constitutional and indeed ideal.191 The possibly
fatal flaw now comes into play. If the jury decides that aggravating factors
exist and those aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating factors, they then
proceed to decide whether or not the defendant should be sentenced to life or
death.192 If the jury cannot come to a decision as to whether the defendant
should receive life imprisonment or the death penalty (as both require
unanimous decisions), this determination then returns to the judge193 or to a
three judge panel194 for determination.
At first this would seem to violate the rule proffered in Ring, but further
discussion is needed. Under this system, the jury truly decides unanimously
and beyond a reasonable doubt whether or not aggravating factors exist, and
only after the jury decides that these aggravating factors exist does the jury
even move to the question of life or death. If the jury does not find
aggravating factors, a verdict of life imprisonment must be returned. Since the

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2000).
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 175.552 – 175.556 (2001).
See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2000).
See, e.g., id.
Ideal statutes will be discussed more fully herein.
See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2000).
MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2000).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.556 (2001).
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jury is truly making the initial factual determination, does this system violate
Ring?
A strong argument, based mainly on the spirit of the majority holding in
Ring, can be made that this system does not violate Ring. The statute in
Arizona,195 which was specifically held unconstitutional, is markedly different
from this variety of state statutes. The Arizona statute had no jury involvement
and left the determination of the sentence solely to the judge.196 In Missouri
and Nevada, the question of the judicial sentencing of the convicted defendant
can never be reached unless the jury first unanimously finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating factors exist beyond a
reasonable doubt.
There are two main differences between these statutes and the ideal state
statutes. First is the automatic reversion to life imprisonment or a term of
years if the jury is unable to decide on sentencing. Second is the exact
detailing of which aggravating and mitigating factors were found by the jury.
The two-tier schemes employed by Missouri and Nevada seem to offer similar
constitutional protection to other state statutes with the only difference being
that if the jury is unable to decide on the sentence after it has decided that the
aggravating factors exist, the decision will then return to the judge for the
ultimate determination.
Courts interpreting the Missouri statute have largely sidestepped the issue
of constitutionality of the Missouri sentencing scheme and pattern jury
instructions in sentencing a defendant under Ring,197 theory being that in order
to get to the life and death determination in Missouri courts, one must assume
that the jury has reached a unanimous decision to at least one aggravating
factor. This assumption has operated for a long time and is a sound legal
inference. There are two main problems with this theory after Ring. First, the
jury is not required to enumerate which aggravating factors it found in
deliberations. The problem with non-enumeration is that the judge, in
considering which sentence to choose in the case of a deadlock, knows not
what the jury was considering in its deliberations. This then forces the judge to

195. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703 (2001).
196. Id.
197. Smith v. Bowersox, 311 F.3d 915, 918 n.2 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating
Missouri’s pattern jury instructions, which were given at Smith’s trial, direct the jury to
return a sentence of life imprisonment if it cannot unanimously agree on at least one
aggravating factor. In the past, where the jury did not impose a sentence of life
imprisonment, we have presumed that the jury did find at least one such aggravating
factor. However, we note that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ring v. Arizona,
now requires the jury to find an aggravating factor before the judge may impose a
sentence of death. We express no opinion as to whether Missouri’s pattern instructions
and procedures are constitutional under Ring. (internal citations omitted)).
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go through a second fact-finding in sentencing the defendant, which may run
this system afoul of Ring. The second problem is the issue of weighing all of
the aggravating factors against mitigating factors. If the jury deadlocks, the
judge then has to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors. This raises the
question of whether this weighing of factors is fact-finding in itself. Many
courts have taken the position that this process is a mere weighing of interests
and not fact-finding.198 However, some courts have seen this as fact-finding in
itself.199 If this process is indeed determined to be fact-finding, this system
could also be unconstitutional under the Ring decision.
The Nevada Supreme Court has recently addressed the issue of the
applicability of Ring to the Nevada statute. It found that both the initial
determination by the three-judge panel after a deadlock by the jury that
aggravating and mitigating factors exist as well as the weighing of the
aggravating and mitigating factors against each other are both inherently factfinding endeavors and therefore must be done by the jury alone after Ring.200
This decision renders the Nevada statute unconstitutional under Ring. This
court’s interpretation of Ring is interesting in that two of the aggravating
circumstances did not truly entail fact-finding because those factors were that
(1) the murders were committed while engaged in a robbery, where the
defendant was also convicted of robbery; and (2) that the defendant committed
more than one murder when he was indeed convicted of four murders by the
jury. It is interesting that these aggravating factors that some courts have
found not to entail fact-finding201 have here been determined to be fact-finding.
Whereas the Nevada Supreme Court believes this to be an unconstitutional
practice, a strong argument can be made that this practice may indeed be
constitutional, albeit unconventional and imperfect.202
The key difference between the judicial involvement between Arizonatype and Missouri-type statutes is that in Missouri, the judge is not the sole
official making factual determinations as to whether the aggravating factors
indeed exist. The only judicial involvement is that the judge may, if the jury

198. Ex Parte Waldrup, 2002 WL 31630710 at *6 (“the weighing process is not a factual
determination . . . in fact, the relative weight of aggravating circumstances and mitigating
circumstances is not susceptible to any quantum of proof”).
199. Johnson v. Nevada, 59 P.3d 450, 460 (Nev. 2002).
200. Id.
201. See e.g., Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 705 (Anstead, C.J., concurring).
202. Another issue still to be determined (outside of the scope of this paper) is whether or not
the Supreme Court will expand its list of sentencing enhancement guidelines that can
constitutionally be found by the judge alone. Currently, only prior convictions can be found on
this way because this requires no fact-finding. However, other factors such as multiple killings or
commission of another felony, if the defendant is also convicted of those crimes may be
permissibly found in the future, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
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deadlocks, decide on the basis of the facts which sentence the convicted
defendant should receive.203 Arizona used a system where the judge was the
sole fact finder, completely leaving the jury out of the picture. These
differences are more than simple semantics and are true substantive differences
that should make the difference between passing constitutional muster and
being ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. While it would still be
advisable to amend these statutes to comport with the ideal statutes, it does not
seem that these statutes should be ruled unconstitutional based on the direct
holding or rationale of Ring.
5. Optimal Statutes
Despite all of the apparent problems with the above-mentioned statutes, an
overwhelming majority of the jurisdictions that impose the death penalty do
indeed conduct their sentencing in exactly the manner in which the Supreme
Court suggests that they should. The advantage of these state statutes is the
number of safeguards which are in place to ensure that aggravating factors, if
they are to be found, are found in a constitutional manner. These safeguards
include (1) having the jury alone make these factual determinations; (2)
making sure that the findings are made unanimously and beyond a reasonable
doubt; and finally (3) if the jury is unable to do each of these things, the
sentence will automatically revert to a lesser term of prison time. The judge
has no fact-finding role in the entire process.
The states which followed this regiment before the Ring decision included:
Arkansas,204 California,205 Connecticut,206 Georgia,207 Illinois,208 Kansas,209
Kentucky,210 Louisiana,211 Maryland,212 Mississippi,213 New Hampshire,214
New Jersey,215 New Mexico,216 New York,217 North Carolina,218 Ohio,219

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030 (2000).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603 (1987).
CAL. CODE §§ 190.3 – 190.4 (1999).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a (2001).
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-30 – 17-10-30.1 (2000).
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/9-1 (Supp. 2002).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624 (2000).
KY. REV. STAT. § 532.025 (2001).
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905 – 905.8 (1997).
MD. CODE ANN. CRIMINAL LAW § 2-303 (2002).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (1999).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (1996).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West Supp. 2002).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-20A-1 – 31-20A-3 (Michie 2000).
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (Supp. 2002).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (Supp. 2002).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (West 2002).
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Oklahoma,220 Oregon,221 Pennsylvania,222 South Carolina,223 South Dakota,224
Tennessee,225 Texas,226 Utah,227 Virginia,228 Washington,229 and Wyoming,230
as well as the general federal death penalty statute231 and a specialized federal
procedure for cases involving drugs.232 Although the statutes vary slightly,
they all include these basic safeguards mentioned above. Because of the
safeguards that are present in these state statutes, there seems to be little
question that these statutes are constitutional after Ring.
D. Retroactivity: The Future of Current Cases
Whenever the Supreme Court issues a landmark opinion of criminal
procedure such as this, one of the main questions left open by the opinion itself
is the applicability of the basis and rationale of the opinion to those already
incarcerated. There are a few well-settled principles which should be
addressed initially.
First, it is a well settled matter that this case may now be used as precedent
for all cases which are yet to happen.233 Second, it is also well settled that if a
case has been adjudicated at the trial level, that this case may be used on direct
appeal in an attempt to invalidate the statute upon which they were
sentenced.234 Third, as a matter of policy, all of the states that allow for capital
punishment have clemency procedures through the executive branch of the
controlling authority.235 The questions left open involve post-conviction relief
and collateral attacks. These are often handled through federal habeas corpus
motions236 and similar state proceedings.237 Thus the question must be
answered as to the applicability of this decision to persons who have already

220. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 §§ 701.10 - 701.11 (1999).
221. OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (1999).
222. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (Supp. 2002).
223. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 2001).
224. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-27A-2 - 23A-27A-5 (Michie 2001).
225. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (Supp. 2000).
226. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37-071 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
227. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76.3-207 (2002).
228. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 2002).
229. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.95.030 – 10.95.080 (2001).
230. WYO. STAT ANN. § 6-2-102 (Michie 2001).
231. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591 – 3593 (2000).
232. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2000).
233. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2442 (“stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law”).
234. See Standard Industries, Inc. v. Tigrett Industries, Inc., 397 U.S. 586, 587 (1970).
235. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (“[t]he governor shall have power to grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses except treason”).
236. 28 U.S.C. §§2254-2255 (2000).
237. See, e.g., Mo. R. Crim. P. 29.15 (West 2000).
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exhausted all of their appeals, but still wish to escape a death sentence which
may have been unconstitutionally imposed.
This area of jurisprudence is also fairly well settled. Generally, rules that
are promulgated after direct appeal and in time for a post-conviction relief
motion cannot be used to upset a verdict on collateral attack or post-conviction
relief.238 There are, however, two narrow exceptions to this general rule.239
First, there is an exception for rulings that place “certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority.”240 Put more simply, a movant in a collateral attack case may be
granted a new hearing if a certain conduct is decriminalized.241 This exception
is obviously not applicable to Ring, because felony murder has not been
decriminalized.
The second exception under Teague is for cases that are “central to an
accurate determination of innocence or guilt.”242 Again, more simply, this
exception provides for retroactive application of “watershed rule[s] of criminal
procedure.”243 It may at first seem that the rule in Ring would be a watershed
rule of criminal procedure, but it must be realized how narrow this watershed
exception truly is. In fact, only one reported case has held its promulgated rule
of criminal procedure so central to be considered “watershed.”244 In realizing
how narrow this exception is and comparing this rule to the other rules
examined, it can be seen that this rule is not so central to be considered
watershed.
Of the courts that have addressed this issue, many of them have failed to
reach the issue, but the ones that have squarely addressed the retroactivity of
Ring expressed that “[petitioner] is simply incorrect in asserting that the
combination of Teague, Ring and the cases in the Apprendi line render the rule
announced in Ring retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”245
For the above-stated reasons, the rule adopted in Ring cannot be considered a
watershed rule. Because neither of the Teague exceptions applies; the Ring
decision simply cannot be applied retroactively to collateral attack cases.

238. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306-07 (1989).
239. Id. at 307.
240. Id.
241. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 477 (1993).
242. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307.
243. Id. at 311.
244. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
245. Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 992-93 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Sibley v. Culliver,
No. CIV.A.02-A-1217-N, 2003 WL 256907, at *11 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 3, 2003); State v. Towery,
Nos. CR-02-0031-PC, CR-02-0022-PC, CR-02-0038-PC, CR-02-0146-PC, 2003 WL 548386 at
*6 (Ariz. Feb. 26, 2003).
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Subsequent Cases246

Despite the relative short amount of time that the Ring decision has been
law, the number of court challenges based on this landmark case has been
remarkable. Many cases have discussed this case and that number continues to
grow daily, but the number of cases to directly address the content of this case
note is still relatively small. There are cases which distinguish the challenged
statutes from the Arizona statute invalidated in Ring, and cases which follow
lock-step behind the Supreme Court and invalidate state statutes based on
Ring. Those two types of cases will be discussed below.
1. Distinguishing Cases
The number of cases which have distinguished the Ring opinion is
relatively small. This is most likely a result of the fact that courts are hesitant
to not follow the reasoning of the highest court in the land, even if the statute is
clearly distinguishable. In addition to this, statutes which are clearly not
implicated are likely not to be challenged and therefore no cases reported.
Of the cases which distinguish the Ring opinion, one of the most
interesting247 is the Florida Supreme Court case of Bottoson v. Moore.248 In
this post-conviction relief case, Petitioner Linroy Bottoson attempted to have
the Florida death penalty statute249 invalidated on the basis of the Court’s
decision in Ring. The Florida Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, denied
his post-conviction relief on the basis that (1) Petitioner’s execution was stayed
by the Supreme Court prior to the Ring decision and the Court released the stay
after the decision was released without discussing the implication of Ring on
the Florida statute; and (2) the Supreme Court specifically did not overturn any
precedent in Ring upon which the Florida statute relied for its constitutional
basis.250 With these considerations, The Florida court determined that
Bottoson was not entitled to relief.251
Other than the Bottoson case, the Indiana Supreme Court refused to
squarely address the applicability of Ring to the Indiana death penalty
statute.252 In Wrinkles v. State, the court found that there was no reason to
address the issues because of the complete implausibility of the Petitioner’s
246. Subsequent cases published to Westlaw as of Apr. 1, 2003.
247. Interesting not for the differentiation of the statute, but because of the opinions of the
concurring Justices suggesting why Florida’s statute should be unconstitutional in light of the
Ring decision.
248. Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 695.
249. FLA. STAT. ch. § 921.141 (2001).
250. Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 695.
251. Id. (three Justices do discuss serious problems, in their opinions, with the Florida statute
in light of Ring, those concurrences will be discussed at length herein).
252. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 2002).
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arguments.253 The aggravating factor that was used to sentence the Petitioner
in this case was the fact that multiple murders had been committed and the
court found that the jury did establish this fact when it returned its verdict in
the guilt phase because it found him guilty of three counts of murder.254 Since
the jury found these facts unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, the
Ring issue is not properly addressed.255 A similar issue was raised in Alabama
in Ex Parte Waldrup; the aggravating factor was the fact that the defendant
killed the victims in the course of a robbery.256 Since the defendant was found
guilty of homicide committed in the commission of a robbery, the court
determined that the jury did indeed make the factual determinations necessary
for the aggravating factor.257
Other than these major cases, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
refused to extend Ring to the Oklahoma death penalty statute258 without giving
much guidance.259 However, in concurrence, Justice Johnson more fully
explained that Ring is inapplicable to the Oklahoma statute because the
requisite aggravating factors are all determined by the jury in accordance with
Ring.260
There have also been two federal cases to address the constitutionality of
the federal death penalty statute261 and the fact that it does not require the
government to indict the aggravating factors as part of the substantive charge.
In effect, this would change the offense charged to the initial offense plus the
aggravating factors so that all of the facts necessary will be found by the jury
as if they were all elements of the crime.262 The court rejected this argument
and suggested that the aggravating factors were required to be found by the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but that there was no requirement that the
offense itself should be changed to incorporate the aggravating factors.263
2. Cases which Follow Ring
All across the country, direct appeals and post-conviction relief cases are
being filed on the basis of the Ring decision. Many courts that have considered

253. Wrinkles v. State, 776 N.E.2d 905, 907-08 (Ind. 2002).
254. Id. at 908.
255. Id.
256. Ex Parte Waldrup, 2002 WL 31630710 at *5.
257. Id.
258. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 §§ 701.10 - 701.11 (1999).
259. Murphy v. State, 54 P.3d 556, 566 (Okla. 2002).
260. Id. at 578.
261. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591 – 3593 (2000).
262. United States v. Reagan, 221 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677-78 (E.D.Va. 2002); United States v.
Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d 672, 679 (E.D.Va. 2002).
263. Reagan, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 679; Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d at 680.
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this issue have suggested that the sentencing schemes in their respective
jurisdictions do indeed follow Ring or are unconstitutional under Ring. On
June 28th, 2002, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded four Arizona cases
for reconsideration in light of the Ring decision.264
After Ring, a number of jurisdictions are reviewing their death penalty
statutes. One such jurisdiction is the federal government, where the Federal
Death Penalty Act was recently held unconstitutional.265 Judge Sessions
reviewed the Federal Death Penalty Act and found that because the
aggravating factors are to be treated like elements after Ring, the relaxed
evidentiary standard available at sentencing is unacceptable because it allows
for the evidence introduced at sentencing to be treated differently than the
evidence at trial, and therefore must be unconstitutional.266
In addition to this federal court, the Supreme Court of Idaho has also
suggested that the decision of the Supreme Court in Ring “appears to invalidate
the death penalty scheme in Idaho.”267 Arizona has also realized after Ring that
its death penalty statute is unconstitutional and has ordered that all of the
defendants sentenced under the old scheme be re-sentenced or have their
sentences reduced to life with or without parole.268
Finally, the Nevada Supreme Court has recently held its death penalty
sentencing scheme unconstitutional. In a case where the jury was unable to
reach a verdict as to a life sentence or the death penalty after determining the
existence of aggravating factors and this determination was then turned over to
a panel of three judges,269 those judges imposed the death penalty. The
Supreme Court of Nevada then reversed that verdict as being contrary to the
holding in Ring.270 The court determined that because both the initial
determination of aggravating and mitigating factors as well as the weighing of
those factors against each other required some factual determination, this
statute was unconstitutional after Ring.271 This ruling is unique because the
Nevada statute was the closest statute to ideal to be struck down to date, and
may show the true far-reaching impact of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ring.

264. Allen v. United States, 122 S.Ct. 2653 (2002) (mem.); Harrod v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2653
(2002) (mem.); Pandeli v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2654 (2002) (mem.); Sansing v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct.
2654 (2002) (mem.).
265. United States v. Fell, 217 F.Supp.2d 469, 483 (D.Vt. 2002).
266. Id.
267. State v. Fetterly, 52 P.3d 874, 875 (Idaho 2002).
268. See e.g., State v. Smith, 50 P.3d 825, 831 (Ariz. 2002).
269. Johnson, 59 P.3d 450 at 458-59.
270. Id. at 454. The aggravating factors were that the killings were committed in the
commission of a robbery, to which the defendant was also sentenced and that the there were more
than two killings in one incident, where the defendant was convicted of four murders.
271. Id. at 459.
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Besides the jurisdictions to rule their death penalty sentencing schemes
unconstitutional, one of the most interesting debates about the application of
Ring to a state statute is occurring in Florida. The Bottoson case272 sidestepped
the issue of the applicability to Ring to the hybrid sentencing structure of
Florida, but the concurring justices in Bottoson signaled that this was not the
last to be heard from that court on this issue.273 Three of the justices suggested
that the Florida statute was indeed unconstitutional under Ring and were
mystified as to why the majority did not address this issue.274
Chief Justice Anstead suggested that the Florida statute has serious
problems because (1) the nature of the advisory opinion system violates Ring;
and (2) that advisory opinion is not even required to be unanimous, again
violating Ring.275 Chief Justice Anstead nonetheless concluded that since the
Ring opinion did not overrule Florida’s statute or the Supreme Court precedent
for it, that the result reached by the majority was indeed correct.276
Justice Shaw argued that the Florida statute violates Ring because the
aggravating factors are the functional equivalent of elements which should be
proven unanimously and Florida does not require such a unanimous finding.277
Justice Shaw also concluded that this Petitioner was not entitled to relief,
because one of the aggravating factors found was prior convictions, the one
aggravating factor which can still be found by a judge after Ring.278
Justice Pariente believed that the Florida statute was functionally similar to
Ring and should be found unconstitutional,279 but believed that because of the
Supreme Court precedent, that this was an issue for the Supreme Court to
address and thus concurred in the result.280 Despite the fact that the
272. Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 704 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
273. Id. at 725 (Pariente, J., concurring in the judgment).
274. Id (Pariente, J., concurring in the judgment).
275. Id. at 705 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
276. Id. at 704 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
277. Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 716 (Shaw, J., concurring in the judgment).
278. Id. at 718-19 (Shaw, J., concurring in the judgment).
279. Id. at 725 (Pariente, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating:
In effect, the maximum penalty of death can be imposed only with the additional factual
finding that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors. In effect, Florida juries in
capital cases do not do what Ring mandates—that is, make specific findings of fact
regarding the aggravators necessary for imposition of the death penalty. In effect, Florida
juries advise the judge on the sentence and the judge finds the specific aggravators that
support the sentence imposed. Indeed, under both the Florida and Arizona schemes, it is
the judge who independently finds the aggravators necessary to impose the death
sentence. Whether the non-unanimous advisory role of Florida’s penalty phase juries is of
sufficient constitutional significance under the Sixth Amendment to distinguish Florida’s
sentencing statute from the Arizona statute invalidated in Ring is a question for the United
States Supreme Court to decide.).
280. Id. (Pariente, J., concurring in the judgment).
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circumstances of this particular case were not correct for the ruling of the
Florida statute unconstitutional under Ring, it seems to forecast that the day
Florida overrules this statute is not too far away after the Florida Supreme
Court’s ruling in Bottoson. The Florida court has subsequently held up the
Bottoson case in other post-conviction relief as well as direct appeal cases in
Florida.281 This fate could reach many other state statutes as this decision has
more of an opportunity to work its way through the courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because of the considerations mentioned above, the case of Ring v.
Arizona was indeed correctly decided. It must be understood that Ring was not
a watershed decision; it was merely the logical extension of Apprendi to the
death penalty. Prior to this decision, it was odd to see the Supreme Court
attempt to distinguish its prior precedent while creating an unintelligible rule.
As previously mentioned, stare decisis is important to U.S. legal history. It is
important not only to preserve the finality of decisions made and rules
promulgated, but also to provide some measure of predictability to our legal
system. This latter goal is what allows our common law system to survive and
is truly a cornerstone of American jurisprudence.
While these considerations are no doubt important, what measure of
predictability is furthered by a rule of conflicting cases that even the Supreme
Court has a difficult time interpreting and applying to fact situations? In this
situation, the Supreme Court and the American public are better off creating a
new rule, one which not only provides a certain amount of guidance to the
public, but also to legislatures so that they can create statutes which will
comport with the Constitution. When we have a rule that allows a judge to
increase a sentence from life to death, but disallow as unconstitutional a
sentencing scheme which adds two years to the jury sentence, how can this
comport with the constitutional and practical concerns of fairness to the
convicted defendant? Why should a capital defendant actually enjoy less
protection under the Constitution than an ordinary criminal defendant?
These were the questions that needed to be answered in the Ring case, but
were these questions answered? Did the Ring Court answer these questions
and create a more user-friendly rule? The Court attempted to standardize the
system and create a rule which would allow for predictability. What the Court
failed to do was provide much guidance as to a threshold for what will amount
to constitutional sentencing and what will violate the Sixth Amendment. The
rule promulgated is that any fact which, if found, could lead to the sentencing
of a defendant to a term greater than she could have been sentenced following
an adverse verdict from a jury, must not be found by the judge alone. While
281. See e.g., Anderson v. State, No. SC95773, 2003 WL 124468 at *16 (Fla., Jan. 16, 2003).
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this is not the clearest rule of criminal procedure, it is certainly a clearer rule
than what existed before Ring. The old rule was similar but had to be qualified
by the Court’s jurisprudence, which made it much more complicated. The
rule, as it now exists, does provide some minimal guidance to legislatures, as
well as some measure of predictability to potential defendants and fair and
even application under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
But there are still questions remaining under this rule. Statutes, like
Arizona’s, that leave the process of fact-finding solely to the judge are
unconstitutional. Statutes which leave fact-finding entirely to the jury seem to
be constitutional so long as the facts are found unanimously and beyond a
reasonable doubt. The issue that still remains relates to hybrid systems.
Hopefully, this case note has addressed some of those questions. By looking at
the letter and the spirit of the Ring holding as well as subsequent case law; it
can be seen that it is the effect and not the form of the system which should
determine its constitutionality. Some judicial fact-finding may still be
acceptable under Ring, but states must be careful in allowing any significant
judicial fact-finding after Ring.
The issue of what requires fact-finding and what does not may also arise.
Some aggravating factors clearly do not require fact-finding, such as prior
convictions. Other aggravating factors also seemingly do not require any factfinding. Aggravating factors such as multiple killings or multiple crimes, if the
defendant is convicted of all of the elements of the aggravating factor do not
seem to require fact-finding, but it remains to be seen if the Court will expand
its list of aggravating factors which may be constitutionally found by a judge
alone.
In addition to the roles issue and defining what requires fact-finding, the
issue of retroactivity must be answered. This case may indeed increase the
number of petitions for post-conviction relief, but this begs the question to
Justice O’Connor that if the defendants were sentenced in an unconstitutional
manner in the first place, shouldn’t we want them to challenge their sentences;
isn’t that why we have post-conviction relief? Also, if it is judicially
determined that this rule is not retroactive, none of these post-conviction cases
will prevail and eventually will tail off and cease to be a drain on the resources
of the judicial system, a small price to pay.
The remaining questions are much more of clarity than of substance. The
exact holding of the Court needs to be clarified to determine if what was meant
is that judges alone must not serve as fact finders or if what was meant is that
juries alone must find these facts. This leaves open for attack those systems
which use both the judge and the jury or the judge alone after a deadlock by a
jury to determine the facts for aggravation and mitigation. Some of these
systems may indeed be constitutional, but it would be wise for legislatures to
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take note of the Court’s position and carefully review their statutes in light of
Ring.
The intent of this case note was to answer some of the remaining questions
left open under Ring and hopefully it has accomplished this goal by identifying
those states which may have problem statutes and making a judgment as to
whether or not those statutes may still constitutionally stand after Ring. One
thing is sure, we have finally received clear guidance from the Supreme Court
about how to reconcile Walton with Apprendi and Jones; we cannot.
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